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ARGUMENT OF REPLY BRIEF
I. Franklin Covey Does Not Prohibit the Use of Rule 60(b) by Bybee.
In opposing Bybee's appeal, the Fishers make the bald assertion that
"Utah law is clear that a Rule 60(b)(1) motion is not the proper vehicle to
challenge an alleged mistake of law by the trial court." (Brief of Appellees at 12.)
The Fishers rely on the simple fact that a panel of the Utah Court of Appeals
held in 2000 that "an appeal or motion for new trial, rather than a 60(b) motion, is
the proper avenue to redress mistakes of law." Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
v. Melvin, 2 P.3d 451, 2000 UT App 110, % 2 1 .
A.
The doctrine of stare decisis prevents Franklin Covey from overruling
prior cases.
Nevertheless, as Bybee has pointed out previously, other decisions of the
Utah Court of Appeals have seemingly held the opposite—that "a judicial error or
'mistake of law by the trial court may support a Rule 60(b) motion/" Bischel v.
Merritt, 907 P.2d 275, 277 (Utah App. 1995); see also Otteson v. State, 945
P.2d 170, 172 (Utah App. 1997); Udy v. Udv, 893 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah App.
1995). These decisions must be accorded equal weight as Franklin Covey.
The Fishers even concede that "[p]rior to the Franklin Covey decision, a
Rule 60(b) motion was the proper vehicle to challenge an alleged mistake by the
trial court in fundamental law." (Brief of Appellees at 9 (emphasis added).) In
fact, to the extent that the Franklin Covey court may have disregarded prior
decisions of the Court of Appeals in reaching its decision, it may have violated
the principle of stare decisis, "[S]tare decisis has equal application when one

l

panel of a multi-panel appellate court is faced with a prior decision of a different
panel." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993); State v.
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995).1
Accordingly, Franklin Covey should not be accepted as dispositive of the
issues presented in Bybee's case. Instead, Franklin Covey can, and should, be
distinguished from the present matter on several bases, as previously
established by Bybee in his initial brief.
B.

Rule 59 was not available to Bybee as it was in the Franklin Covey case.
The most important distinction to be made between Franklin Covey and

our case rests on the fact that Rule 59(a)(7) was available in Franklin Covey to
support a motion for new trial based upon an alleged "[ejrror in law." In that
case, the motion alleging a mistake of law was made following the trial court's
grant of summary judgment on the merits. No one disputes the right of an
aggrieved party to present a Rule 59 motion following a grant of summary
judgment. See Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Utah
App. 1990); Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc., 767
P.2d 125, 127-28 (Utah App. 1988).
Inasmuch as Rule 59 clearly permitted the unsuccessful party in Franklin
Covey to address an alleged mistake or error of law with the trial court, that
ruling can easily be justified on the basis that a Rule 60(b) motion could not be

]

"Stare decisis forges certainty, stability, and predictability in the law. It also
reinforces confidence in judicial integrity and lays a foundation of order upon which
individuals and organizations in our society can conduct themselves."
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 292.

brought after the ten-day time period allowed for a Rule 59 motion when the
Rule 60(b) motion was based upon the same grounds that would have
supported a Rule 59 motion. In other words, the Franklin Covey court could
simply view the motion labeled a Rule 60(b) motion, to be in reality an untimely
Rule 59 motion. It is axiomatic that Utah courts will look to the substance of the
motion, not the caption provided, to determine the true nature and type of the
motion. Bishop v. GenTech, 48 P.3d 218, 2002 UT 36,1J28; Bair v. Axiom
Design, L L C 20 P.3d 388, 2001 UT 20, lf9.
Contrary to the Fishers* assertions, Rule 59 was not available to Bybee in
this case. The plain language of Rule 59 permits a motion "for a new trial" under
that rule only following "the entry of the judgment." (Emphasis added.) As far as
Bybee can determine, Utah courts have previously allowed the use of Rule 59
only in connection with a judgment, entered either following trial or following a
grant of summary judgment. See, e.g. Interstate Land Corp., 797 P.2d at 1105.
The Fishers rely on dicta contained in the Moon Lake and Interstate Land
Corp. cases to stretch the rulings of those cases to support the Fishers'
proposition that a Rule 59 motion may follow any decision made by the court.
Those cases only dealt with the availability of Rule 59 following a grant of
summary judgment. In fact, prior to those rulings, it was apparently accepted
that Rule 59 was only available following "a full evidentiary trial, not [even] a
summary judgment." See, e.g., Id. at 1105.
Indeed, the quoted language relied upon by the Fishers comes from
Wright and Miller's Federal Practice and Procedure: "The concept of a new trial
3

under Rule 59 is broad enough to include a rehearing of any matter decided by
the coi Jrtw!*

""' " *

ni i

Procedure, * ' ^ "
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Nevertheless, even these commentators are only

addressing the availabilny of Rule 59 following a judgment entered on the merits
111-., '", i «i i ii I >' i ill i i il , i |i ii

"i.< -i 'hi»! i < A Federal Practice and Procedure lollou '

tf ie quoted language by explaining:
On a motiori for a new trial in a nonjury case, the trial
"^'
open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional
testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make
new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment. A motion for new trial in a nonjury case
should be
based upon manifest error of law or mistake of fact, and a judgment
should not be set aside except for si jbstantial reasor
hi , »y<J,Hl)4 (emphasis added). Despite the Fishers' assertion*- no Utah case has
ever held that Rule 59 provides a mechanism for addressing 1 inal court's
in Il

not a judgment on the merits.
Accordingly, Rule 59 was not available to Bybee to preset it I lis claim ,.;

Bybee Did Not Disregard the Appeal Deadline, but Attempted
to Present the Alleged Error to the Trial Court for Correction
Prior to an Appeal,
The Fishers argue that allowing a party to challenge an alleged
law by the Trial Court t h • uqh the use of Kuie 60(h) allows the party to simply
ignoi

.

-
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to appeal at a later date. Admittedly, "parties should not be allc

. .o escape

the consequences of their failure to file a timely appeal by addressing questioi is

of law to the trial court for reconsideration." Franklin Covey, 2 P.3d 456-57, ^
21.
However, the Fishers' argument is a bit of a red herring in our case. Even
a properly brought Rule 60(b) motion will usually provide a party with another
basis for appeal after the time for appealing the underlying judgment or final
order has expired. 2
Moreover, the concern expressed in Franklin Covey simply does not exist
in this case. Bybee is not attempting to circumvent the rules for filing appeals
"by addressing questions of law to the trial court for reconsideration." Id.
(emphasis added). The Trial Court never had an opportunity to consider the
errors alleged by Bybee let alone to reconsider those issues.
The better policy is that set forth in Bybee's initial brief, establishing that
"in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." State v.
Holqate, 10 P.3d 346, 2000 UT 74, U 11; see also Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352,
1354 (Utah 1986) ("The court must be afforded a timely opportunity to correct its
e r r o r . . . . This is so [when] the error involves a question of law or procedure.").
Similarly, in holding that Rule 59 provided a means for challenging errors
even when no trial had been held, the Moon Lake court seemed to recognize
that "it is unrealistic to hold that the only remedy left to a litigant after a summary

2

It should be further noted that a properly brought Rule 59 motion actually tolls the
time for appeal, and the briefing, arguing, and deciding of such a motion could
potentially result in the aggrieved party having more than three months from the
date the judgment is entered to file a notice of appeal from that judgment.
5

judgment is to file an appeal
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be given an opportunity to correct errors of law
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Most likely, Judge Harding Jr. signed the order simply because the Fishers
submitted an order and no opposition had been filed—which would make the matter
one of inadvertent judicial oversight by the Trial Court and not one of a fundamental
misconception of the law. Because Judge Schofield heard the arguments
pertaining to the Rule 60(b) motion, he obviously could not know what Judge
Harding Jr. was thinking when he signed the Fishers' order.

law in entering a judgment against a party in default, but even then "the party
asserting the error must first present the issue to the trial court through the
appropriate post-judgment motion [based upon Rule 60(b) or Rule 59] prior to
seeking appellate review" (emphasis added)).
III. The Plain Language of Rule 60(b) Should Not Be Ignored.
In Utah, court rules are construed according to their plain language. See,
e.g., Dipoma v. McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225, 2001 UT 61,1J13; Hartford Leasing Corp.
v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 701 (Utah App. 1994). As has been previously
addressed, the plain language of Rule 60(b)(1) encompasses a mistake of law—
especially when Rule 59(a)(7) is otherwise unavailable to an aggrieved party.
Moreover, according to the rule's plain language, a motion for relief based upon
Rule 60(b)(1) may generally be brought within three months of the order's entry.
This Court should not now read restrictions into Rule 60(b) not actually
expressed in the rule's language.
As the Fishers have pointed out in their brief, the federal courts are nearly
evenly split on the issue of whether Rule 60(b)(1) can be employed to address
judicial mistakes.4 While some of those courts have permitted a Rule 60(b)
motion only if made within the period for filing a timely appeal, such a
requirement likely a determination that the Rule 60(b) motion was not otherwise
brought within a reasonable time. However, the Federal Rule 60(b) otherwise
allows motions based upon Rule 60(b)(1) to otherwise be brought within one
4

The Fishers' statement that a "majority" of federal courts will not allow a Rule
60(b) motion to challenge an alleged mistake of law by the trial court is not
supported by the cases cited.
7

year of an order's entry, not merely within three months. Accordingly reliance
upon federal court interpretation of Rule 60(b) should not be accorded undue
weight in this case—especially at the expense of the rule's plain language.
Moreover, the Court should remember that the Trial Court in this matter
made no determination as to whether Bybee's Rule 60(b) motion was made
within a reasonable time, but instead determined that Bybee could not rely on
Rule 60(b)(1) to challenge a mistake of law.
In fact, the Fishers never argued to the Trial Court that Bybee's Rule
60(b) motion was not made within a reasonable time. Furthermore, the Fishers'
failure to file a notice to submit for decision, their failure to provide Bybee a copy
of the proposed order prior to its submittal to the Trial Court, and the fact that
Bybee did not receive any notice of a ruling by the Trial Court or of entry of the
Fishers' order should affect any determination of whether Bybee made his
motion within a reasonable time after the order's entry.
IV. The February 8th Order Should Be Set Aside.
The Fishers now concede that the February 8th Order, entered without
due process of law to Bybee, should be set aside.
V. Conclusion.
On the basis of the arguments and analysis contained in this brief and in
Bybee's initial brief, the Supreme Court should reverse the Trial Court's Order
denying Bybee's Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the February 8th and April 17th
Orders purporting to extend the life of the Fishers' judgment. Rule 60(b)
provided a proper basis for Bybee to present the mistakes of law to the Trial
ft

Court. Indeed, the Trial Court did determine that it was a mistake of law to allow
the Fishers to "extend" their judgment against Bybee by filing a motion rather
than a complaint and summons. Accordingly, the Trial Court's February 8th and
April 17th Orders should be vacated by this Court.

BRIEF OF CROSS APPELLEE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2-2(3)0) of the Utah Code Annotated and Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The nature of the case, the course of proceedings and the case's
disposition below, and a statement of relevant facts have already been set forth
by Bybee in his initial brief. The relevant facts and proceedings pertaining to
both Bybee's appeal and the Fishers' cross-appeal were adequately set forth
therein. Accordingly, Bybee incorporates herein his prior Statement of the Case
by reference.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah case law requires a new action be brought within eight years in order
to renew a judgment. That has been the allowed method identified in virtually
every recorded Utah case addressing the renewal of a judgment. Inasmuch as
Utah courts have clearly established the process to follow, the fact that other

9

jurisdictions may allow a judgment to be renewed by a motion-such as a motion
for a writ of scire_facias-is mostly irrelevant to the analysis of this case.
Moreover, Utah's Legislature has manifested a plain intent that judgments
should have effect for only eight years, and that an action on a judgment may be
commenced only within eight years of the judgment's entry. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-22 and § 78-22-1(1). Utah courts have considered these
provisions to establish an eight-year statute of limitations for judgments.
Indeed, the lien of a renewed judgment takes effect only upon the entry of
the renewal judgment and does not extend the prior judgment lien. Utah courts
are powerless to extend the life of the judgment lien. In light of the foregoing,
the Trial Court should not be permitted to disregard express legislative
enactments and extend the life of the judgment itself.

ARGUMENT
The Fishers have cross-appeal the Trial Court's ruling that the Fishers
should not have received an extension of a judgment past eight years because
"the appropriate method to extend a judgment was by a new action, a new
complaint." The ruling is consistent with Utah law on the subject.
I. Utah Case Law Requires a New Action to be Brought
to Renew a Judgment.
This Court has declared that "[a] money judgment forms the basis for but
two legal proceedings: (1) a suit thereon, brought within eight years wherein it
forms the basis or chose in action for a new judgment or (2) some form of

proceeding in execution for collection," also to occur within eight years.
Yergensen v. Ford, 402 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1965) (emphasis added).
Unless a judgment creditor "can bring another action on the judgment
within the eight-year period, he has no way of preventing the loss of his justly
adjudicated claim. . . . [A] judgment may be sued upon if the action is brought
within the eight-year statute of limitation." Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 1322,
1324 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added).
While some states may allow judgments to be renewed by a simple
motion, such is not the case in Utah. 5 The Fishers' reliance upon Von Hake v.
Thomas, 858 P.2d 193 (Utah App. 1993), is misplaced. The Von Hake case in
no way establishes that a judgment may be renewed by filing a motion in the
same proceeding. Instead, the Von Hake court was concerned only with
whether one party's unsatisfied contempt punishment in the original proceeding
affected his right to appeal the subsequent renewal judgment. The court thus
concluded that the renewal action should be treated in that case "as simply a
continuation of the original proceeding." ]dL at 196.
Even so, the Von Hake court based its reasoning on the fact that "the
renewal judgment appealed from arises, ultimately, from the same cause of
action that culminated in the original judgment." jdL Even so, the court
expressly recognized that a renewal proceeding "is commenced by the filing of a
new complaint and summons." Id. (emphasis added).
5

Inasmuch as Utah has not previously allowed a judgment to be renewed by
seeking a writ of scire facias, the Fishers' discussion of jurisdictions permitting scire
facias proceedings is not particularly helpful to the analysis of this case.
11

In addition, even the Utah federal case cited by the Fishers to support
their rationale indicated that "[i]n the Utah case opinions surveyed by the court,
renewal of a judgment has apparently been proceeded by the filing of a
complaint and its service on the judgment debtor." McCarthy v. Johnson, 35 F.
Supp. 846, 848 (D. Utah 1997) (emphasis added).
II. Utah Statutory Law Prohibits Courts from "Extending" a Judgment.
Pursuant to Utah statute, "judgments shall continue for eight years from
the date of entry in a court unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of
the judgment is stayed in accordance with law." Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1(1)
(emphasis added). Utah courts have recognized this statute as creating a
"statute of limitations" for the validity and enforceability of judgments. See, e.g.,
Sittner v. Schriever, 22 P.3d 784, 2001 UT App 99 (referring throughout the
opinion to the "statute of limitations" created by this statute).
Similarly, an action upon a judgment may only be brought within eight
years. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22; see Yergensen, 402 P.2d at 698
(concluding that an action to renew a judgment brought more than eight years
after the date of entry of the original judgment was barred by this section).
These plain statutory provisions provide an eight-year limitations period
"without any indication of an intent upon the part of the legislature to extend the
period." k l , at 698. The Trial Court should not be permitted to disregard these
express legislative enactments and extend a judgment beyond eight years.
With respect to a related issue, Utah courts have previously "ruled that the
lien of a judgment expires at the end of the statutory period established by the

legislature and that the courts are powerless to extend it beyond that time. . . .
[T]he courts cannot extend the life of a judgment lien." Federal Farm Mortgage
Corp. v. Walker, 206 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1949) (emphasis added); see also
Orton v. Adams, 444 P.2d 62, 64 (Utah 1968) ("The lien of a renewal judgment
attaches only from the date of the entry of the renewal judgment, and does not
relate back to the date of entry of the judgment thus renewed nor extend the lien
of the first j u d g m e n t . . . . " ) .
The same reasoning should be applied in this case. If a trial court is
powerless to "extend the life" of a judgment lien, the trial court should not be
permitted to "extend the life" of the judgment itself as was done by the Trial
Court in this case. See Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1988)
(recognizing that "a renewal judgment results in a new judgment" and not merely
an extension of an existing judgment).
CONCLUSION
In Utah, a judgment may be renewed only by commencing a new action
within the eight-year limitations period and obtaining a new judgment that would
provide a new basis for collection and a new judgment lien. Bybee respectfully
requests that the Supreme Court affirm Trial Court's ruling that the Fishers were
required to file a summons and complaint in order to renew their judgment
against Bybee.
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